India: slouching toward superpowerdom? by Kugelman, Michael
2012-7-16
India: Slouching toward superpowerdom?
blogs.lse.ac.uk /southasia/2012/07/16/india-slouching-toward-superpowerdom/
Responding to a recent LSE IDEAS report, “India: The Next Superpower?”, Michael Kugelman argues that
India has the resources to be powerful, but lacks the ability to manage and deploy them.
The last few months have not been kind to Shining India.
First an LSE report suggested India cannot, and should not, become a superpower because of (among other things)
its immense societal challenges. Then a western investor, speaking of India’s recent economic troubles, told the
Financial Times that the country “is close to becoming the Greece of Asia.” And now an article in the latest issue of
Foreign Affairs argues that a fractured, corrupt and out-of-touch political culture is keeping India down.
These assessments amplify what we already know: India’s society, economy, and politics are troubled. We’ve all
heard how the country suffers from more gender inequality than Pakistan; how there is more poverty in eight Indian
states than in all of sub-Saharan Africa; and how nearly a quarter of Parliament has been charged with committing at
least one crime.
Does all this underscore India’s deep domestic distress? Absolutely. Yet does it also mean India’s quest for
superpower status will fall short? Not necessarily. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, after the Berlin Wall crumbled
and the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States’ superpower status was crystal clear—yet during that same
period, America was ravaged by racial tensions, rising homelessness, a crack cocaine epidemic, and the spread of
AIDS. Many if not all superpowers have problems at home.
Brute strength, however, is never a problem. Traditionally, the term “superpower” is code for military clout—hard,
hulking, herculean power that can take out external enemies and protect weaker allies. This is the standard by
which superpower potential should be judged. And on this count, India has a long way to go.
I say this not because India lacks the resources to be powerful, but because it lacks the ability to manage and
deploy them.
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India undoubtedly has power. As Iskander Rehman notes in his portion of the LSE IDEAS report, the nuclear-armed
nation is the world’s largest weapons importer and its military constitutes the world’s third-largest volunteer force.
However, New Delhi gives little indication that it has an actual strategy for marshaling these resources and using
them in the most efficient manner. This reflects a constraint that many Indians—including those in the security
establishment—openly admit: a lack of strategic planning. Arun Prakash, a former naval chief of staff, laments how
“every military operation since independence has been guided more by political rhetoric than strategic direction.”
The story of Prakash’s former employer is a case in point. In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that
many of India’s chief security concerns now emanate from the sea. These include terrorism (recall that the 2008
Mumbai attackers arrived via the city’s port), Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean Region (from port and
infrastructure development off Pakistan and Myanmar to natural resource acquisitions in the Bay of Bengal), and the
volatile neighbourhoods housing India’s sea-based energy holdings (think of those offshore assets in the Persian
Gulf, and remember that about two-thirds of India’s oil consumption comes from overseas).
A fledgling superpower must ensure that it has the means to address such concerns. Yet the institution charged with
sea-based contingencies, the Indian Navy, receives the smallest share of the military budget, and, with just 55,000
personnel, is dramatically outsized by the million-person-strong army. Such disparities were justifiable in past
decades, when India’s chief security concerns (notably border tensions with Pakistan and China) were land-based.
But today is a different story.
India, Rehman explains, suffers not only from a shortage of strategy, but also from institutional weaknesses—from
dismal civil-military relations to a lack of cooperation among the three military branches. India, he concludes, must
undertake “a transformational overhaul of its institutions and procedures” in order to become a truly global power.
Reading that line, I was reminded of something that noted security specialist Brahma Chellaney once wrote about
India’s political corruption. Chellaney, hardly a revolutionary, nonetheless warned that “it may take a second war of
independence for India to gain true freedom from exploitation and pillage.”
Transformation. Revolution. This represents much more than mere reforms or course corrections. With such drastic
measures required to tackle deeply ingrained obstacles, it is folly to assume India can become a superpower any
time soon. The nation’s structural deficiencies preclude its ability not only to properly utilise military resources, but
also to demonstrate the most elementary forms of good governance.
Still, even without superpower status, India is no slouch; it’s doing quite well managing its place in today’s unipolar
world order. As befitting a founder of the non-aligned movement, New Delhi enjoys good relations with a range of
states, from democracies such as America and hybrids like Russia to pariahs such as Iran. India is also active in the
major new multilateral groupings, such as BRICs.  Finally, India’s image abroad is relatively positive
(notwithstanding in several countries on the Subcontinent, where hostile sentiment is often rife).
This raises the question of whether New Delhi truly wants to be a superpower, at least in the traditional (and
western) sense of a power-projecting juggernaut. Given all the talk of India’s military modernisation and weapons
acquisitions, it’s important to point out that such activities are motivated as much by a need to keep pace with China
as by a desire to become a global power. The army has stated that its recent major upgrade in the Ladakh region of
Jammu and Kashmir (which borders the China-administered Aksai Chin area of eastern Kashmir) was part of a
“vision” to catch up to Chinese capabilities. And a top defense official has admitted that a chief maritime priority for
India is to respond to China’s “aggressive modernisation plans.”
Would India be as intent on burnishing its great-power credentials in the absence of a rising China? Most certainly—
yet with considerably less urgency.
Michael Kugelman is the South Asia associate at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in
Washington, DC. 
2/3
Copyright © 2016 London School of Economics
3/3
